A complex regulatory package implementing a new support scheme for renewable electricity has recently been adopted in Spain as a response to escalating support costs, which have mostly been related to solar PV promotion. The new remuneration scheme can be considered retroactive and negatively affects the profitability of existing solar PV plants. The aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of the new retroactive regulation on the profitability of those plants in Spain. Using real data from a very common PV plant, the results show that, indeed, the new support scheme has a considerable impact on the cash-flows of those plants. However, our simulations also show that the degree of reduction in the internal rates of return critically depends on several factors, assumptions and scenarios.
I. Introduction.
A recent regulatory package has led to the implementation of a new scheme for the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in Spain, which has involved a substantial rupture with the pre-existing system. A main feature of the new scheme, which was passed in 2014, is its retroactivity, i.e., it applies to existing plants which were subject to the previous regulation (either the Royal Decree (RD) Indeed, the promotion of RES-E in Spain has received a lot of attention in the past, given the significant increase in the deployment of RES-E in general and solar PV in particular, which was mostly a result of stable and generous feed-in regulations.
Some articles are devoted to the analysis of the public promotion of RES-E in Spain ( [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] ), whereas others have specifically focused on solar PV ( [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ).
Spain has also received worldwide attention due to the implementation of the aforementioned measures to contain the costs associated to this deployment between 2010 and 2013. The government was concerned about the substantial increase of RES-E support costs (see, e.g., the Special Report of the IPCC on Renewable Energy, [13] ).
This increase in support costs, which triggered the implementation of cost-containment measures, was mostly due to solar PV promotion, with support costs escalating more has been analysed by several authors (e.g. [14] [15] [1] ). However, to our best knowledge, the economic impact of the new regulation has not been researched. This paper tries to cover this gap in the literature.
The retroactive cuts of the new regulation in Spain can also be set in the context of retrospective measures directly attacking the stability and viability of existing PV installations in several EU countries in recent years (see, e.g., [16] ). Accordingly, this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief background and details of the new regulation for RES-E support in general and solar PV in particular. Section 3 discusses the methodology, data and main assumptions which have been used to analyse the economic impact of the new regulation on the profitability of a solar PV plant. This analysis is carried out in section 4. The paper closes with some concluding remarks.
2.
The new renewable energy promotion scheme in Spain.
The motivation for the new regulation.
The RES-E support scheme in Spain has been based on feed-in tariffs (FITs) and feed-in premiums (FIPs) since 1998, with some rather minor reforms of the whole scheme taking place in 2004 and 2007. As it is well known, FITs provide total payments per kWh of electricity of renewable origin, whereas a payment per kWh on top of the electricity wholesale-market price is granted under FIPs. which led to a ten-fold increase in solar PV deployment. While this boom was circumscribed to the solar PV sector, it led to a substantial increase in RES-E support costs (see Table 1 
Main concepts in the new regulation.
The new legislation is based on several main concepts:
• Reasonable profitability. This is a main concept which is defined by RDL 9/2013 as a project profitability based on the average yield (pre-tax) of Spanish 10-year government bonds in the secondary market plus 300 basis points (i.e. 3%). The "average yield" refers to the average of the yields in the 10 years before the entry into force of RDL 9/2013 in July 2013. This profitability may be revised every 6 years. According to such calculation, the reasonable profitability level was 7.39% at the time the Law 24/2013 was passed (December 2013). This concept applies to, both, existing and new installations (i.e. it is retroactive).
• Efficient and well-managed firm. The reasonable profitability level is the one which corresponds to an efficient and well-managed firm. RDL 9/2013 states that according to European Community jurisprudence, this concept refers to a
This fact, along with poor long-term planning, has resulted in the Spanish electricity system having significant excess electricity generation capacity [15] . 3 Royal-Decree Law 9/2013 which adopts urgent measures in order to guarantee the financial stability of the electricity system. 4 Law 24/2013 of the electricity sector.
firm which is endowed with the necessary means to develop its activity and whose costs are those of a firm with a reasonable benefit. The aim is to ensure that the high costs of an inefficient firm are not taken as reference.
• Plant type and retributive parameters. Each installation, taking into account its main features, will be associated to a standard plant or "plant type". These plant types are defined and classified according to their technology, installed capacity and age in the Ministerial Order. The so-called reasonable profitability of the plant type will then be used to set the remuneration level for the specific plants.
The most relevant retributive parameters include the remuneration for the initial investment of the plant (R inv ), the remuneration for the operation of the plant (R o ), the useful regulatory life, the number of minimum and maximum generation full-load hours, the functioning threshold, the annual lower and upper limits of the market price and the average annual market price
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. The expected electricity demand levels and the general situation of the economy will be taken into account in the setting of these retributive parameters.
• Existing installations. Existing installations which fell under the previous support scheme before July 14 th 2013.
• Regulatory period and revisions. The retributive parameters will be revised every six years in order to comply with the reasonable profitability principle.
The first regulatory period will last from 2013 to 2018. In addition, there will also be "semi-regulatory periods" of 3 years. Revisions can also take place after each semi-regulatory period but these revisions will only apply to the estimates of the revenues of the plant types which are related to the sale of electricity at market prices.
• Useful regulatory life. Once the installation has exceeded its useful regulatory life (i.e., 30 years), it will not receive any support (i.e., neither support for investment nor operation). These installations may receive the electricity market price if they continue to sell their electricity in the market after their useful regulatory life has expired.
• Competitive concurrence scheme. This term is synonymous to "auction". This type of instrument will be used to allocate support to new plants. 5 In addition, an incentive for investments (I inv ) can also be provided for "isolated electricity systems in nonpeninsular territories" on an exceptional basis (art.11).
A description of the new remuneration scheme.
Under Law 24/2013, RES-E plants will receive the market price plus a "specific complementary remuneration". This means that RES-E installations would participate in the electricity market and receive the wholesale price of electricity as well as a "specific remuneration", i.e. an additional remuneration which allows these technologies to compete on an equal footing with the rest of technologies in the market.
This specific remuneration will allow these technologies to cover their costs and has two elements, the remuneration for investment and the remuneration for the operation of the plant:
• The remuneration for the investment (R inv ) refers to a payment per kW that allows installations to recover those investment costs which cannot be recovered by the sales of electricity in the market. This payment is received during the useful regulatory life of the installation.
• The specific remuneration for the operation (R o ) refers to a payment per kWh for those technologies whose operational costs are above the average wholesale electricity price.
Therefore, the specific remuneration for RES-E plants would be the total revenues received by the plant owner (which includes R inv and R o ) minus the revenues from the electricity sold in the wholesale electricity market. Formally, it can be expressed as follows:
where,
TR t
Total revenues received by a given plant in year t (€).
p t
Annual average wholesale price of electricity (€/kWh).
q t RES-E sold in the wholesale electricity market (kWh).
SR t
Specific remuneration received by a given plant in year t (€).
R inv
Remuneration for the investment of the plant (€)
R o
Remuneration for the operation (€)
Unitary remuneration for the investment of a plant type (€/kW) s Size (installed capacity) of the plant (kW).
The unitary remuneration for the investment of a plant type ( ! * ) is calculated as follows
where: ρ is the adjustment coefficient for the plant type. It refers to the investment costs which cannot be recovered by the sale of electricity. It is calculated according to regulated criteria which include the net value of the plant and an estimate of the flows of revenues and expenditures along its useful regulatory life. Furthermore, such specific remuneration will only be received if the capacity of the plant is above a minimum threshold value, which is set annually by the government in a Ministerial Order (art. 31.5). The specific value of the specific remuneration for investment cannot be anticipated by potential investors, since it depends on the parameters defined for each plant type and the length of the useful regulatory life.
Since the wholesale electricity prices constantly change, an upper and a lower threshold have been set on the average annual electricity price in the daily market. If the electricity price is above the upper limit, this will lead to payment obligations for electricity generators and if the annual electricity price is below the lower limit, then will be the support levels after 6 years or even after 3 years regarding the estimates of the revenues of plant types related to the sale of electricity at market prices.This is likely to lead to higher capital costs, given the high risk premiums which are likely to be charged by banks 6 For an analysis of the new regulation taking into account different criteria, see [23] .
• The plant is subject to RD 661/2007
• It is located in radiation zone III.
• The plant occupies 5,700 square meters of land.
• The land was bought at a market price of € 7,850.
• The length of the evacuation line is 500 meters.
• The average number of full load hours in the 2008-2012 period was 2,100 hours, with a load factor of 23.9%. Therefore, the plant generates 210,000 kWh/year (2100 times 100kW).
• The peak power of the investor component is 5% above the nominal power of the plant.
• The upfront investment for the 99.33 kW plants amounted to €639,614.31.
According to the plant's managers, if this plant had been a turnkey plant, then its costs would have been 13% higher.
• 80% of the initial investment is financed with a loan at an interest rate of 6% over 12 years.
• Annual operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (including insurance costs): € 3,600. Land tax: € 30 per plant per year.
• The plant is equipped with arrays with a 2-axis tracking system. Table 2 provides details on the different cost concepts of the plant. Table 2 3.2. General assumptions about the plant.
The analysis is based on the following key assumptions for the plant:
• An annual degradation rate of 0.75% has been assumed, i.e., the generation capacity of the plant is reduced by 0.75% each year. PV systems are often financed based on an assumed 0.5 to 1.0% per year degradation rate [24] .
According to the studies reviewed in [25] the average degradation rate is 0.7%.
Therefore, we assume the middle value, 0.75, as done in [26] .
• A new inverter is purchased every ten years. The inverter for the years 10 and 20
are entirely financed with a loan at a 6% interest rate.
• The costs of the inverters are shown in Table 3 . Their value is added to the initial investment. The net present value is calculated with a discount rate of 2%.
Table 3
• O&M costs increase by 2% annually.
• Until 2013, the CPI has been used for the annual updating of the tariffs. We assume a 2% CPI after 2013 in the scenario without cost-containment measures 7 . This is in line with the goal of European Central Bank, which aims at inflation rates of below but close to 2% in the medium term (see www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html).
• We assume an underlying inflation rate of 1% after 2013. This can be justified since we assume a 2% CPI and the average underlying inflation rate in Spain was half the CPI between 2010 and 2012.This rate is the one used for the updating of the remuneration after 2013, according to RDL 2/2013.
• A useful life of 30 years for the plant has been assumed.
• The wholesale electricity price (pool price) for those kWh of electricity generation which are above the generation cap and, thus, are not eligible for the FITs is calculated as the average electricity price of the daily and intra-daily markets. This price is assumed constant since 2013.
• It is assumed that the residual value of the plant and its components are null.
• The decommissioning costs and the corporate tax have not been included in the calculation.
Data and assumptions on key regulatory variables affecting the plant.
• According to RDL14/2010, the remuneration of plants equipped with arrays with a 2-axis tracking system is capped to 1,707 full-load hours until 2013. The cap is increased to 2,015 full-load hours after 2013.
• According to RDL 14/2010 and RD 1544/2011, there is a grid access charge of 0.05 €cents/kWh after 2011.
• According to Law 15/2012, a generation charge of 7% of total revenues is set.
• Although we assume that the plant has a useful life of 30 years, the remuneration period was set to 28 years in RDL 14/2010.
• The plant type relevant for out plant is IT-00058 ( [23] p. 46474), since ours is a plant subject to RD 661/2007, with a capacity higher than 100 kW but lower than 2 MW, with arrays with a 2-axis tracking system and in operation since
2008.
• According to Order IET/1045/2014 [20] , the remuneration levels corresponding • As previously mentioned, the new regulation only affects the second half of 2013. In this period, the number of full-load hours was set at 995, which entails • The simulation for 2014-2016 includes the requirements of the new regulation, as well as the revenues due to the sales of electricity in the wholesale market,
i.e., R inv (whose value is the same for the three years), in addition to the annual value of In addition, the following assumptions on key regulatory variables have been made.
• The simulation for the years after 2017 includes the following assumptions:
o For simplicity, a constant wholesale electricity price has been assumed since 2017 until the end of the useful lifetime of the plant.
o It has been assumed that the value of R inv is the same between 2017 and 2019.
o From 2020 to 2037 it has been assumed that the only investment that has to be paid off is the renewal of the inverter and, thus, the amount of R inv is adapted to the amount of the financial costs that this implies 8 .
• 
Table 4
The following two figures show the evolution of the cash flows over the period in the "best" (a reference plant with 80% borrowing) and the "worst" (a turnkey plant with a 100% borrowing level) cases (Figures 1 and 2 Again, the loan is fully repaid in 2020, but this positive effect on the cash flow is partly offset by the lack of support for investment after that year. Therefore, the cash flows after 2020 are positive but very low, leading to very low IRRs for the whole period (Table 4 ).
The detrimental effects of the new regulation on the profitability of the plant adds to the negative impacts of the cost-containment measures adopted between 2010
and 2013. The following figure (Figure 3) shows that the effects of the new regulation are even more detrimental for the profitability of the plant than those related to those cost-containment measures. While the cost-containment measures reduced the IRR by a couple of percentage points in both a reference plant with a loan of 80% for the initial investment (solid line) and in the worst of cases, i.e., a turnkey plant with a loan of 100% of the initial investment (discontinuous line), the new regulation sinks the IRR by six additional percentage points. This is mostly due to the virtual elimination of support for investment after 2020 ( !"# ). The situation in the real world could be even worse because the simulation does not include the opportunity costs of the funds provided to cover the negative cash flows.
Several factors affect the reduction in the profitability of the plant as a result of the new regulation. These factors include different borrowing levels, changes in the initial investment, whether the plant is turnkey or not and continuation of support after 2019.Therefore, we have carried out simulations to identify the impact of the new regulation on the IRRs in different scenarios, e.g., under different values for those factors. Table 5 summarises the results, which are further discussed below. Table 5 4.2.1. Impact of different borrowing levels.
Borrowing levels refer to the percentage of the initial investment which is financed by a loan. The impact of different borrowing levels on the IRR of the plant has been calculated (40%, 60%, 80% and 100%). Obviously, greater percentages entail lower IRRs because the financial expenditures associated to the loan are greater. In some cases the IRR can vary by as much as 3% between the 40% and 100% borrowing levels. In fact, this factor seems to amplify the negative influence of the new regulation.
For example, the difference in the IRR between the 40% and 100% cases in the RD 661/2007 is 1.67% (9.10% to 10.77%), whereas this difference is wider in the new regulation (2.79%, from 2.35% to 5.14%) However, in this article we have also calculated the IRR if such investment support was extended post-2020. This continuation could be justified by the government in order to offset the poor economic conditions of the solar PV plants, given their very small revenue flows (low wholesale price and low ! ), which leads to very low cash flows and, possibly, to the closure of many solar PV plants. Therefore, we have 11 It is assumed that the 100% is financed by a loan. 12 According to our calculations, the wholesale price should double since 2017 (from 0.053€/kWh to 0.106€/kWh) in order to obtain a 5% IRR. There would be two opposing influences on this price: the increase in fossil fuel prices and its reduction due to the merit order effect with increasing RES penetration levels. Table 4 This paper has shown that, indeed, those concerns are justified. The new regulation has a considerable negative impact on the profitability of solar PV plants.
However, the degree of reduction in profitability levels critically depends on several factors, assumptions and scenarios. Therefore, upper and lower bounds for profitability levels have been provided in this article.
The cuts and retroactive changes are likely to have a highly detrimental effect on future deployment. On one hand, they will certainly increase the risk-premium associated to renewable energy investments in Spain, increase investor risks and reduce the attractiveness to invest in this country. These negative impacts on effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in deployment (due to higher capital costs) should have been weighed 
